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Michael C. Dorf’s “Review” of
Richard A. Posner, Divergent Paths: The
Academy and the Judiciary1
A Response by the Book’s Author
The editor of this journal has invited me to write a rejoinder to Professor
Dorf’s review—which I am happy to do although “rejoinder” is more
antagonistic than I am inclined to be in commenting on his review. Much
of it I either agree with or can’t see much proﬁt in disagreeing with. And I
am ﬂattered by his references to my judicial opinions dealing with supervised
release and same-sex marriage. But I don’t think that his piece is accurately
characterized as a book review, because a book review is expected to give the
reader of the review an idea of the scope and contents of the book, and Dorf
doesn’t do that. You would not guess from the review that Appendix D of
my book2 lists 75 problems of the federal judiciary and 48 possible academic
solutions, all touched on in the book. Dorf mentions few of either the problems
or the solutions. I would not expect any reviewer of my book to discuss 123
problems and suggested solutions. But Dorf’s “review” fails to convey an
accurate picture of the book to his readers. Nor are all his criticisms on the
mark, as I shall now try to show.
In footnote 15 of his piece Dorf describes as “petty” my criticizing the
frequent misspelling by lawyers and judges of the Latin phrase de minimis non
curat lex (the law doesn’t concern itself with triﬂes) as de minimus non curat lex. If
minimis were the only, or one of a handful, of words that lawyers and judges
frequently misspell, my drawing attention to the misspelling would indeed
be petty. But as Dorf fails to mention, that word is only one of a number
of words and phrases that I criticize on pages 123 and 124 of my book, all
being words and phrases that appear frequently in briefs, judicial opinions,
and law review articles. I do not consider these criticisms of what amounts to
systematic bad legal writing “cranky,” as he contends, or my criticisms of the
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Bluebook and of much else regarding legal composition as “cranky.” I would
like to see him defend the Bluebook—its length (560 pages),3 its cost (~$36),4
its unintelligible abbreviations (guess what words “Auth.” “Auto.,” “Broad.,”
“Bhd.,” “Ent.,” “Prot.,” “Res.,” and “Unif.” are Bluebook abbreviations of), its
opacity, its superﬂuity. The handbook that I give my law clerks contains ﬁve
pages on citation format; that’s enough.
Very strangely—quite mischaracterizing my book—Dorf implies that I tried
but failed through “pointed criticisms” of Justice Scalia “during the last years
of Scalia’s life” (does Dorf think I was trying to hasten his death?) “to turn
Scalia into a Posner-style legal realist.” That’s absurd. I could no more have
done that, and so would have wasted my time trying, than I could turn my cat
into a dog. I would like my book to have some impact on the profession. But
I know its impact will be slight, in part because of the complacency of some
judges and more professors, in part because of certain immovable barriers to
reform, such as the election of most state judges and the selection of federal
judges by politicians (the President and Senators), and above all because of
the stodginess of the profession. The profession marches forward, but with its
head screwed on backward—transﬁxed by an eighteenth-century Constitution
of limited relevance to the twenty-ﬁrst century, by an antiquated vocabulary,
by opaque verbal formulas (“actual innocence,” “rational basis,” “intermediate
scrutiny,” “arbitrary and capricious,” “abuse of discretion,” and so on ad
inﬁnitum), and by countless obsolete precedents.
I am surprised to ﬁnd Dorf saying that my describing “judges not as
interpreters of legislation but as partners of the legislators” is “old hat.” The
quoted passage has a context that he ignores. I say that “judges have been
given the thankless task of ‘interpreting’ statutes that can’t be interpreted in
many of the cases to which the statutes apply. Often there is no discernible
legislative intent regarding potential cases within the statute’s semantic reach
. . . . If the legislators did not foresee an issue arising under their statute
that has become a subject of litigation, there isn’t anything to interpret . . . .
Interpretation is recovery of meaning, and there is no meaning to recover in
such cases.”5 The result is to make judges legislators. Old hat? Dorf’s known it
forever? Or heresy? What would Scalia have said?
When Dorf discusses my criticisms of academic legal scholarship he turns
defensive—he is after all himself a legal scholar. Yet I am surprised to ﬁnd him
defending two very questionable books on constitutional law, by Professor
Laurence Tribe (The Invisible Constitution) and Professor Akhil Amar (America’s
Unwritten Constitution), respectively—both of which I have criticized sharply
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in a book that Dorf does not mention6 and thus fails to rebut. Although
he suggests implausibly that the Tribe and Amar books are read by judges,
he doesn’t name any, and I’d be surprised if there were any except me—the
unfriendly reader.
Dorf waxes particularly wroth at criticisms I level at two articles by
Harvard Law Professor Richard Fallon. I quoted from the articles passages
that I claimed and claim would be unintelligible to judges—and I now add, to
lawyers and law students and many law professors as well. I quoted at length
from the articles, and now I refer the readers of this response to my quotations
for conﬁrmation of my criticisms.7 I imagine Dorf would respond that a select
circle of law professors could understand Fallon’s articles, but I can’t see how
the articles (which I do not mean to suggest are characteristic of the entire
corpus of Fallon’s scholarly writing8) could be useful to the judiciary, or for
that matter to legal education.
I never say, as Dorf supposes, that legal scholarship has no value for legal
education, the judiciary, or the practice of law. But I do argue that its value for
these enterprises is diminishing as legal scholarship, especially at the elite law
schools, becomes ever more esoteric, as the faculties of those schools become
ever more crowded with scholars whose ﬁrst loyalty is to other scholarly ﬁelds.
Often those are ﬁelds in which they obtained advanced degrees yet realized
that the chances of landing secure, well-paying academic jobs in those ﬁelds
were slight—a development to which Dorf, in defending legal scholarship,
does not allude.
He claims that I “want[s] academics to show that legal realism is correct,”
an aim he deems “naïve.” No, I want academics to be realistic about judicial
behavior—to grasp for example the degree to which judicial behavior deviates
from the formalism that continues to be the oﬃcial ideology of the judiciary,
encapsulated in John Roberts’s absurd claim in his Senate conﬁrmation
hearing that a Supreme Court Justice is the equivalent of an umpire or referee,
who does not make rules but merely enforces the rules given to him. The
critical fallacy in the remark is that an umpire or referee may inﬂuence but does
not decide the outcome of the game (the side with more fouls may nevertheless
win), but judges do decide the outcome of cases.
Dorf discusses legal realism at length in his “review,” describing me as a
legal realist—a label I’m happy to wear—and, less accurately, as wishing to enlist
academics to spread the realist gospel and “banish all vestiges of formalism”—a
crusade I have never thought to embark on. His thoughts on legal realism do
not appear to be coherent. On the one hand he quotes approvingly an article
in which Brian Leiter, a prominent professor at the University of Chicago Law
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School, declares that “we are all realists now,” and on the other hand he regards
as quixotic what he imagines to be my crusade against—formalists, which if
they don’t exist could not be the target of a crusade. A certain tendency to
self-contradiction is illustrated by his unintentionally amusing statement that
“Posner does have some good ideas about legal education, but even these
seem half-baked.” Half-baked ideas are not good ideas.
One of my suggestions in Divergent Paths for reforming law school teaching
was that civl procedure and evidence be treated as clinical courses—that instead
of being taught as bodies of rules they be play-acted. The students, rather than
immersing themselves in the rules of civil procedure or of evidence, would
draft complaints and conduct depositions in their civil procedure course and
conduct mock trials in their evidence course. (I taught such evidence courses
at the University of Chicago Law School, using the superb case ﬁles of the
Institute of Trial Advocacy, for several years in the early 1990s.) Dorf objects
that such curricular changes would “raise cost questions” because “clinical and
simulation course are more labor-intensive than Socratic or lecture courses”
and would therefore require larger law school faculties and so greater expense.
But he is wrong, because such teaching can be done better by adjuncts—
practicing lawyers or judges (me for example)—who receive slight and often
no compensation, than by law professors who have no practical experience.
As for his suggestion that my criticisms of current legal-writing courses are
“misinformed” because actually they enable students to “take poetic license,
and their writing begins to ﬂow,” I haven’t seen poetry in student writing or in
judicial opinions, most of which are drafted by law clerks, most of whom are
recent law school graduates. In fact, most law schools place little emphasis on
writing skills; often a ﬁrst-year course in legal writing is the only such course.
And although Dorf claims that legal-writing instructors discourage their
students from resorting to legal jargon, it would be more accurate to say that
some of the instructors try to discourage use of jargon, but judging from the
number of jargon-ridden student law-review comments and judicial opinions,
the instructors are rarely successful. I am appalled by his endorsement of
the writing “systems,” taught in some law schools, called IRAC (Issue,
Rule, Application, Conclusion) and CRAC (Conclusion, Rule, Application,
Conclusion). Those are straitjackets. I am reminded of Holmes’s crack that “to
rest upon a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death.”9
The crowning peculiarity of Dorf’s “review” is that it has very little to
say about the judiciary. The subtitle of my book is “the academy and the
judiciary,” and the judiciary (that is, the federal judiciary—I do not discuss
state judiciaries, about which I know little) gets a good deal more attention
in the book than the academy does. Yet apart from Judge Harry Edwards
of the D.C. Circuit, I am the only living judge mentioned in Dorf’s article,
and even his references to dead ones (mainly Holmes, Hand, and Friendly)
are few. In a book of more than 400 pages I make a large number of speciﬁc
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criticisms (75, remember) of judicial practices and speciﬁc recommendations
(48) for academic solutions; the vast majority both of the criticisms and of
the suggested solutions Dorf ignores entirely. The reason I surmise is that as
an academic his priority is to defend the academy from my barbs; he seems
not very interested in the judiciary, in the quality of judicial appointments
and judicial opinions, in the failures of judicial management and the lack of
relevant diversity on the Supreme Court, and the numerous other criticisms
of that and other courts that I deploy. His lack of interest in the judiciary
conﬁrms my concern about the growing gap between the academy and the
judiciary.
Enough; let me end with a ﬂourish—an eﬀusive, very hard-to-believe, recent
statement by Justice Kagan that illustrates the lack of realism that is one of the
abetting sins of American law. After expressing her “boundless admiration and
aﬀection for Justice Scalia—‘I just loved Justice Scalia, and I miss him every
day’” (could that be tongue in cheek?)—she remarks that she “would put this
court as a whole up there with any court that the country has ever had in terms
of the kind of legal skills, proﬁciency and lawyerly aptitude that this court has
. . . . Our court is in general a very, very, very lawyerly place . . . . It’s natural
to have people who have spent lots of years of their lives thinking about legal
analysis.”10 I would say rather that the current Court is a very political place,
and that the Justices are deﬁcient in career diversity, deﬁcient in understanding
science and technology, virtually bereft of trial experience, and underworked.
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